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Executive summary
How do marginalised communities 
use technology for transparency 
and accountability?
This paper synthesises reflections and learnings from two studies, in Kenya and 
South Africa, about how marginalised communities – lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans  
and queer (LGBTQ) people in Nairobi, Kenya, and economically marginalised 
housing and urban development rights activists in Johannesburg, South Africa – 
use technologies commonly applied in transparency and accountability work, and 
the limits of their use of these technologies. 
Technology for transparency and accountability (T4T&A) initiatives intend to make 
the public functioning of government visible, and states accountable to citizens 
for their actions. This research assumes that privacy and anonymity are important 
tactics for activists using technology, especially in transparency and accountability 
work that challenges institutions and authorities. However, privacy is practically 
impossible to maintain on popular, commonly available, proprietary platforms, 
many of which are deployed in T4T&A activities. Does this limit activists’ work 
with technology and if so, how? What are the other risks and barriers marginalised 
people face in their use of technology? 
Questions based on these concerns were clarified through formative interviews 
with 26 people, and fieldwork interviews with 37 people. The most significant 
reflections from both case studies are that: 
• marginalised users have different needs for privacy and security online, and 
T4T&A activities need to integrate these concerns 
• collaborations across and within technology and activist movements and 
communities must recognise their different histories of engagement with 
politics, technology and the state
• without the full enjoyment of human rights, marginalised people’s participation 
in T4T&A activities is bound to be limited.
540
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1 Digital technology applications are increasingly popular tools employed in work around civic engagement, democratic 
participation and transparency and accountability in governance and public services. This is visible in open data and open 
knowledge movements, social media and map-based applications, and the combination of other open data, data journalism and 
visualisation for government transparency and public accountability.
2  Maya Ganesh and Jeff Deutch worked on the Kenya research. Jennifer Schulte planned and conducted the fieldwork in South 
Africa, based on background work by Maya Ganesh who, with Jeff Deutch, also analysed the South African results and wrote the 
report findings. 
Introduction
The Tactical Technology Collective (Tactical Tech) 
carried out two case studies that investigated 
how marginalised communities of activists in 
Kenya and South Africa use digital technology, 
and the limitations, risks and barriers they face 
in doing so. These studies were inspired by 
McGee and Carlitz’s questions about why the 
marginalised in a society do not use technology 
for transparency and accountability (T4T&A) 
applications1 – even if they have access to digital 
devices (McGee and Carlitz 2013). This report 
synthesises findings from the two studies, and 
frames them as reflections and learnings to inform 
future T4T&A activities.
The two case studies are based on semi-
structured fieldwork interviews with 37 
respondents in two communities – lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, trans and queer (LGBTQ) 
people in Nairobi, Kenya, and economically 
marginalised housing and urban development 
rights activists in Johannesburg, South Africa2 
– conducted over a six-month period. These 
two communities are marginalised by race, 
class, socio-economic status, gender and sexual 
identity – characteristics that overlap and 
intersect. The identification of fieldwork interview 
respondents, and the process and content of the 
fieldwork interviews, were shaped by 26 formative 
interviews with key informants in the two 
communities, carried out over the seven months 
preceding the fieldwork. 
The two case studies were initially focused on 
exploring the tension between anonymity and 
visibility for marginal populations online. They 
interrogated the anecdotal finding that increased 
online visibility for the issues faced by marginalised 
communities has the side effect of making 
individuals visible too – often to their detriment, 
because they are working in hostile local political 
contexts. The findings show that such individuals 
have a legitimate need for anonymity and privacy, 
because technology platforms do create negative 
exposure, but that threats tend to be local, lateral and 
personal, originating within families, communities 
and movements. This research confirms the nature 
and dynamics of this tension, and looks at the way 
that it affects use of digital technologies.
The case studies refer to two very different 
communities in specific political, social, economic 
and historical contexts; thus they are not directly 
comparable, nor is that the intention of this report. 
Rather, it attempts to reframe what marginalised 
communities’ access to and use of digital technologies 
implies for T4T&A activities. It discusses the design 
and results of the research, before presenting a 
series of reflections to make sense of the findings 
in light of T4T&A activities. It also draws on 
conversations and inputs from members of both 
communities in Nairobi and Johannesburg who 
participated in outreach events in October 2015, 
where the study results were fed back for comment 
and discussion.
640
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2. The research: questions, 
context and design
The two studies this report is based on started 
with the observation that there is a tension 
between anonymity and visibility in the use of 
digital technologies: that while digital technologies 
– primarily social media and mobile phones – can 
help amplify and create visibility for marginalised 
activists’ issues, at the same time they make the 
activists themselves visible in ways that they often 
find they are unable to control. This inability to 
control their own visibility as activists presents 
risks to their work, particularly if their work 
deals with sensitive issues that directly challenge 
institutional power or corruption. The potential 
for different kinds of negative exposure were 
investigated in the context of technology use in 
activists’ work, and across the range of different 
risks and barriers they face. What did negative 
exposure mean for LGBTQ people in Nairobi, and 
low-income, black and mixed-race people working 
on housing and urban development rights in 
Johannesburg?
The tension between anonymity and visibility 
is positioned within two broad frames of 
discussing T4T&A: the ‘open’ movement and 
T4T&A initiatives, which promote visibility and 
publicity for public information, public servants 
and processes; and the ‘data rights’ discourse, 
which is about anonymity and individual rights to 
privacy and freedom from surveillance. How are 
the two reconciled when the technologies that 
encourage openness and visibility – mobile phone-
based applications, crowdmaps and freedom of 
information requests – also invite violations of 
privacy, and enable surveillance by their very 
architecture and technical specifications? Is there 
a middle ground between visibility and anonymity, 
and if so, how is it managed?
Developing an argument based on this tension led 
us to frame it within the notion of risk to the work 
of marginalised people who are using technologies 
for transparency and accountability, as well as 
in their personal lives. In doing so, the research 
question expanded to look at how technology fits 
into the wider context of activists’ lives and into 
the political context of their activism, and what 
implications this has for activists’ engagement 
with T4T&A activities. Thus, this research has 
been developed in response to the question: how 
do digital technologies fit within the wider context 
of the lives of marginalised activists, and within 
the political context of rights in Kenya and South 
Africa, and what implications does this have for 
their engagement with T4T&A activities?
To answer this question, the study addressed the 
following sub-questions:
• How and for what purposes are marginalised 
activists using technology – personally, and in 
their activism?
• How does this use vary according to socio-
demographic differences within marginalised 
communities?
• What are the risks and barriers marginalised 
activists face in using digital technologies in 
their transparency and accountability work?
The following section provides context to these 
questions by describing the risks faced by activists 
in their use of technology. This is followed by a 
discussion of the different ways in which visibility, 
invisibility and anonymity can be unpacked in the 
context of transparency and accountability, and 
marginalised communities.
Putting the questions in 
context
This section provides a background to Tactical 
Tech’s work and how our engagement with activism 
informs our approach to these questions. We 
were curious about the limits of online activism 
enabled by digital technologies: how can citizens 
and governments engage in meaningful dialogue 
through technology when governments are actively 
persecuting or marginalising citizens through 
violence and criminalisation? What happens when 
these citizens are marginal in society and have few 
social safety nets and little social capital to protect 
themselves? How does their marginalisation play 
out in their use of digital technologies, and what 
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3 “Mr Kaye observes that encryption and anonymity, separately or together, assist in shielding opinions from outside scrutiny 
(particularly important in hostile environments), empower individuals to circumvent censorship and other unlawful barriers to 
the free flow of information, and shield journalists, researchers, lawyers and civil society from unlawful surveillance and 
harassment. In this regard, encryption and anonymity provide individuals and groups with a zone of privacy online to hold 
opinions and exercise freedom of expression without arbitrary and unlawful interference or attacks” (Privacy International 2015).
are the risks and limits to their use of technology? 
How can the promise of ‘visibility’ be unpacked to 
shed light on what it could mean for historically 
invisible communities?
The flip side of technology in 
activism: the risk of exposure
Tactical Tech has been ‘bookmarking’ cases of 
how the Web 2.0 Internet is implicated in negative 
outcomes for activists and human rights defenders. 
Activists who are articulate and effective online can 
face a range of threats and harms from authorities, 
institutions and people they know who are 
threatened by their actions. Sometimes, activists, 
journalists and those working to expose corruption, 
injustice and violence in and by public institutions 
need to work anonymously to protect sources, 
whistle-blowers and themselves. This tends to 
affect people who are already marginalised in their 
societies most seriously. For example, the Kvinna 
till Kvinna Foundation’s work with women human 
rights defenders in precarious situations around 
the world documents the impact on them of online 
harassment and offline harms mediated through 
technology (Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation 2014).
The struggle to control digital traces was an issue 
for activists in the Hong Kong protests of late 2014. 
For those protestors who had been underground 
for many years prior to the street protests, it 
was important to remain undetected; however, it 
was also an opportunity for these movements to 
become more active above ground. This tension 
was heightened by the promotion of a mobile 
phone application for activists to report on events 
on the ground, which was discovered to introduce 
malware into a user’s phone. Although a technology 
for transparency group, Code for Hong Kong, was 
named as having developed the application, they 
were not in fact responsible. Activists were therefore 
being spied on to track and record their movements 
and information (Boehler and Sam 2014).
Jailed Egyptian activist Alaa Abd El-Fattah was 
awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of 
Thought in 2014, but it was later rescinded when 
his tweets from two years prior were discovered, 
purportedly calling for ‘death to Jews’. It turned 
out that a selection of tweets about Zionist settlers   
taking over Palestinian lands and the Israeli army’s 
attacks on Gaza had been taken out of context and 
misinterpreted (Muftah 2014).
In the USA, the Los Angeles Times published the 
names of individuals who donated to support or 
oppose Proposition 8, an initiative in California 
to constitutionally define marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman (Minkhoff et al. 
2014). By doing so, it exposed the people who 
cared enough to put money into supporting or 
opposing marriage equality, revealing their private 
affiliations before Proposition 8 went to the vote. 
One notable example of someone who got caught 
in the transparency net was Brendan Eich, the 
Chief Execuitve Officer of Mozilla, the company that 
makes the Firefox browser. His donation in support 
of Proposition 8 – against marriage equality (Ball 
2014) – jarred with Firefox’s public image as an 
employer that supports LGBTQ equality in the 
workplace, as well as aligning itself with a pro-
privacy position.
Marginalised groups who become visible and 
identifiable may face a higher risk of offline 
violence or discrimination. For example, the 
Egyptian police uses Grindr, the dating application 
popular with gay men worldwide, to triangulate, 
identify and arrest LGBTQ users (Sheils 2014); 
similarly, in Lebanon, police are using WhatsApp to 
target and entrap gay men (Mamba 2014). Grindr 
recently removed its ‘show your distance’ option 
in response to privacy advocates raising concerns 
about the feature (Aravosis 2014), although it was 
later reintroduced.  
In some countries, states are direct instigators 
of surveillance and the monitoring of activists 
and journalists. This raises the issue of the right 
to privacy and the importance of privacy in the 
work of activism, points recently made by Privacy 
International in their discussion of a report by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy, David 
Kaye.3 Serious forms of harassment, and the 
intimidation of activists and journalists by state 
and non-state actors is occurring around the 
world, in environments where activists, civil society 
organisations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) are increasingly being criminalised (Ronan 
2014); revelations by whistle-blower Edward 
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Snowden showed the world the scale of collusion 
between technology companies and intelligence 
agencies, and the use of surveillance on citizens 
globally. 
Across Africa, for example, there are significant 
levels of surveillance and monitoring of activists. 
The South African Right to Know network has a 
project and a recently published report on the 
monitoring and harassment of activists – some 
of whom were involved in the present study – by 
South African government intelligence (R2K 2015). 
The report indicates that there is an ongoing 
practice of creating informants within activist 
communities to get information.
Citizenlab, a security research centre at the 
University of Toronto, Canada, found that 
surveillance malware developed by the Italian 
company Hacking Team was found in Ethiopia, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan (Marczak 
et al. 2014). In 2013, Angolan journalist and 
activist Rafael Marques was found to have been the 
target of surveillance by his government (Gunter 
2014). Governments of some African countries are 
already censoring and monitoring citizen projects 
online, in addition to limiting freedom of the press 
and the protection of journalists (Sasaki and Rising 
Voices 2010).
Thus activists engaged in progressive social 
change and justice work face risks associated with 
digital technology, from top-down surveillance to 
exposure through social media. This context served 
as a starting point and background for investigating 
the kinds of risks and barriers marginalised 
communities face in their use of technology in 
activism in Kenya and South Africa.
Unpacking visibility, anonymity, 
exposure and transparency
The two case studies are based on the argument 
that being unable to manage anonymity and 
visibility online is to risk exposure in the course 
of transparency and accountability work. Web 2.0 
technologies, such as mobile applications, social 
media and maps – tools popularly used in T4T&A 
activities – do not guarantee privacy for the user, 
and therefore states or corporations that are 
threatened by use of these tools for transparency 
have the technical wherewithal to identify the 
citizens using them. This may pose more risks and 
liabilities for those who are already marginalised 
in their societies than it does for those who are 
more secure in their social status and social 
identity, limiting the use of applications for T4T&A 
activities. In order to develop some background 
to this, Tactical Tech wanted to unpack the idea 
of visibility through technology, alongside the 
movement for transparency through technology. 
In doing so, we found that the technical states of 
‘visible’ or ‘anonymous’ can be considered along a 
continuum of visibility that has different symbolic 
and literal meanings for marginalised people, who 
seek to control and negotiate these states both 
online and offline. 
At first glance, visibility and transparency appear 
to be connected concepts. Transparency is to see 
through something that is otherwise opaque. The 
idea of ‘openness’ has also become associated 
with technology for transparency. Open data 
and knowledge are new technical tools that are 
believed to enable transparency. For example, a 
government department can be transparent when 
its functioning and practices are open to scrutiny; 
this may involve everyday, operational aspects 
such as the citizen oversight of government 
budgets, expense sheets and minutes of 
meetings. Dieter Zinnbauer (2012) questions this 
perspective when he suggests that technologies 
of transparency and openness allow governments 
to make claims that they are revealing their 
functioning, but may not actually be doing so. 
He uses the metaphor provided by parliament 
buildings, police booths or financial institutions 
in glass-fronted buildings. By opening up one 
part or aspect of government functioning, such 
as how international aid money is spent, others 
may become (or remain) conveniently obscured, 
such as the government’s purchase of malicious 
surveillance software to spy on citizen activists.
Visibility, invisibility, transparency, openness and 
exposure are perhaps different philosophical and 
technical aspects of the demand for accountability 
from public institutions. They bear discussion 
because transparency is not an open-and-shut 
case. For example, it can have one positive 
or expected outcome in terms of government 
transparency, but mean something else for 
whistle-blowers who are at risk because they can 
be exposed by leaking information. We continue 
by describing some of these different aspects in 
the context of human rights defenders, activists 
and communities working on transparency and 
accountability issues.
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4 In addition to not counting smaller ethnic groups, the final figures for the 2009 Kenyan census were never released. 
(BBC News 2009).
5 Personal communication, Baerbel Heide Uhl, Berlin, Germany, March 2014.
Visibility: ‘being counted’ versus 
exposure
Visibility is about ‘being seen’ in the sense of being 
recognised or acknowledged, and hence ‘counted’. 
‘Being visible’ is considered important because it 
allows the realities of injustice or violence against 
a particular marginal group or identity to be 
recognised and acknowledged. ‘Witnessing’ and 
documentation have therefore been two of the 
most popular and powerful ways in which digital 
technologies have enabled marginalised groups to 
make claims for rights and about rights violations. 
This is the intention of projects such as Harassmap, 
which provide evidence of public sexual harassment 
in Egypt, a topic that women do not readily discuss.
Zanele Muholi’s years-long photographic 
documentation of queer black women in South 
African townships follows in this tradition of visibility 
as witnessing. Through intimate photographs, 
assembled into books and exhibitions called Faces 
and Phases, and more recently in 2015, Isibonelo: 
Evidence, Muholi’s work challenges the invisibility 
of this community, and raises awareness of the 
persistence of violence against queer black women 
in a country where homosexuality is legal.
Another example of visibility as recognition 
or acknowledgement comes from Kenya. In 
2007–08, post-election violence in Kenya was 
drawn along ethnic lines. While collecting ethnic 
data may pose the risk of exposing people from 
marginalised ethnicities by making them known, 
it also enables marginalised groups like smaller 
ethnic communities, which may not have been 
counted before, to be recognised.4 This means 
they can demand resource allocation and political 
representation (Nyambura-Mwaura 2009). Without 
such empirical evidence, these groups argue, it 
becomes almost impossible to document and 
monitor patterns of violence against them.
Visibility can also imply exposure in a negative 
sense, of being exposed through mechanisms of 
surveillance that are embedded in institutional 
infrastructures. For example, in Europe, the migrant 
rights and sex-worker rights network KoK finds 
that continental databases like Euro-Sur are used 
to track and monitor movements of migrants into 
and through Europe.5 In Jordan, Syrian refugees 
are given cash handouts by the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees only when they have had 
their irises scanned using a technology, Iris Guard, 
purchased by by the Cairo Amman Bank which 
administers the handouts (Vrankulj 2014). What 
happens to the refugees’ iris data is not known at 
this point. But Tactical Tech has found that British 
and US intelligence personnel are on the advisory 
board of Iris Guard.
Marginalised communities have not only been the 
targets of surveillance, but also the community on 
whom social surveillance technologies are usually 
tested (Eubanks 2014). Virginia Eubanks’ work 
in the USA shows that concerns around visibility 
and surveillance are familiar to people who are 
socially marginal. Mothers on welfare, for example, 
get subsidies – but their spending is monitored by 
social service authorities who assume they will be 
wasteful, fraudulent or unreliable. 
People of colour invite surveillance through the Stop 
and Frisk programmes in New York City: “An analysis 
by the NYCLU [New York Civil Liberties Union] 
revealed that innocent New Yorkers have been 
subjected to police stops and street interrogations 
more than 4 million times since 2002, and that 
black and Latino communities continue to be the 
overwhelming target of these tactics. Nearly nine 
out of ten stopped-and-frisked New Yorkers have 
been completely innocent, according to the NYPD’s 
[New York Police Department] own reports” (NYCLU 
no date). At the same time, cameras worn by the 
police to monitor their interactions with people 
of colour have recently come to attention during 
considerations of the extent of police violence 
against this community (Stanley 2015).
Worldwide, queer people as a marginalised group 
have historically been the subjects of surveillance 
as a way of identifying, naming, tracking and 
ultimately controlling them (Monahan 2009; Weeks 
2000). At the same time, invisibility is part of the 
experience of being queer and amounts to not 
being acknowledged within society. In societies 
where being LGBTQ is criminalised, or where there 
is pervasive homophobia or transphobia, LGBTQ 
people have a need to remain undetected in the 
mainstream, but at the same time to remain visible 
to those that they would consider part of their own 
community. Tactics for passing as straight may 
include dressing and presenting oneself in a certain 
way, or having an opposite-sex partner to conceal 
one’s same-sex orientation. While passing for 
10
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straight, a LGBTQ person may still use and respond 
to the speech and body language unique to their 
community. LGBTQ subcultures and communities 
around the world are also distinguished by unique 
terms, speech patterns and personal presentation 
styles (Tewksbury 1996). 
In the context of apartheid South Africa, visibility 
and invisibility were enabled by the application 
of bureaucracy as a technology of control and 
management. Here, an elaborate system of racial 
categorisation, fingerprinting, zoning, biometric 
identifiers of race, identity passbooks and over 
160 laws were created to limit black and mixed-
race people’s freedoms of assembly, movement, 
expression and association, and to deprive them of 
other human rights. These systems were fed and 
fired by a constant assertion of race; thus, anyone 
who was not white was made highly visible through 
these technologies, but at the same time made 
invisible in mainstream society because they were 
physically and symbolically excluded. Paul Edwards 
and Gabrielle Hecht present a rounded and complete 
picture of the ways in which narratives of technology 
and the development of national and social identity 
in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa have 
had practical, material and symbolic outcomes:
“The apartheid state aimed to manage its race-
based identity registration – the hated passbooks 
and their related fingerprint databases – with 
computer technology, thereby muting the 
system’s oppressive character beneath a quest 
for bureaucratic efficiency through automation. 
Activists reacted by making the underlying 
technology itself an issue, connecting computers 
to military systems and political persecution by 
the police” (Edwards and Hecht 2010: 620). 
South Africa’s colonial and apartheid regimes 
were not the only ones to use technologies 
of bureaucratic management in this way. 
Michel Foucault coined the term ‘biopower’ to 
describe how modern nation states use various 
technologies, such as taxonomies and classificatory 
systems, to organise, manage and literally control 
large populations (Foucault 1976). Sharply honed 
as a tool of control in colonial contexts, European 
states used these tools at home to classify citizens, 
to identify those who were fit to drive modern 
industries and those who were unfit – the disabled, 
mentally ill, unwed mothers and other ‘social 
deviants’. Thus entire communities were created, by 
being made visible in this manner (Robertson and 
Travaglia 2015). 
The different ways in which visibility, invisibility, 
exposure and transparency intersect, sketched 
out in this section, raise two points for this 
research. First, the ‘tension between visibility and 
anonymity’ – implied by applications of privacy-
enhancing technologies, or the risk of exposure 
through technology – is in fact only one aspect 
of this contradiction. For marginal and invisible 
communities, visibility is an important aspect of 
claims to rights and advocacy, and technology is a 
way of achieving this. But top-down bureaucracies 
that function to organise and manage society 
tend to make marginal communities visible and 
vulnerable. These perspectives form a backdrop 
against which to investigate the practices of 
marginal communities in using technologies, and 
how concerns about exposure, visibility, invisibility 
and anonymity play out in their own particular 
contexts.
Research design, methods and 
approaches
The research used a qualitative methodology based 
on semi-structured interviews with a total of 37 
LGBTQ activists in Nairobi, and housing and urban 
development rights in Johannesburg. Following 
formative, exploratory interviews in both cities prior 
to fieldwork, Tactical Tech developed an interview 
guide and sample determination exercises to 
ensure a robust sampling range. 
Tactical Tech does not work directly in either Kenya 
or South Africa, but has a history of partnerships, 
collaborations and networks with activists in both 
countries. While access to target populations 
was limited, these networks made it possible to 
sample potential respondents purposively through 
‘snowball sampling’ – asking people we knew 
through pre-existing networks to refer us to others 
in their own networks. Respondents were therefore 
all associated with local, regional, national or 
international movements and networks. Moreover, 
given the sensitive nature of respondents’ work, 
which is sometimes confrontational to the state, 
we wanted to maintain a low profile and access our 
sample through known networks. 
There was a particular emphasis on ensuring 
that study respondents were not active users 
of T4T&A applications, in order to identify why 
this was so. However, what qualifies as a T4T&A 
application is up for question: is it custom-made, or 
based on mobile phone reporting, social media or 
11
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crowdsourcing technologies? In the Kenyan context, 
it was harder to come across respondents who did 
not have access to any of these communication 
platforms: they were all familiar and in current 
use, with the exception of crowdmaps. In South 
Africa, there were more respondents from socio-
economically weaker sections of society with less 
access to digital technologies, but every one of 
them was familiar with mobile phones and mobile 
applications.
Research design: Kenya
Desk research
An initial review of background information 
on T4T&A included a review of the literature 
on information communication technology for 
development (ICT4D), as well as of the emerging 
T4T&A field. Literature concerning recent socio-
political events in Kenya, and the status of LGBTQ 
rights, was closely followed during the research 
period. The close monitoring of popular discourses 
of transparency and accountability, technology, and 
LGBTQ rights issues was helpful in reflecting on and 
interpreting the analysis of research results.
Formative interviews
In October 2014, an exploratory visit to Nairobi 
was conducted with two objectives. The first was 
to carry out interviews with local respondents to 
clarify the research questions and methodology, 
to understand the context and ensure that the 
question was relevant, and incorporate feedback 
into project methodology and interview schedules. 
Sixteen interviews were conducted at this time 
with individuals from a range of organisations 
and backgrounds. More than half were associated 
with civic technology and T4T&A projects; the 
rest were a combination of activists from women’s 
rights networks, child rights networks, health and 
development NGOs, and LGBTQ networks.
The visit revealed distinct class divisions within 
the NGO, civic technology and LGBTQ activist 
communities in Nairobi: it would be very easy to 
over-represent middle-to-upper class, educated 
gay men (and some lesbian women) from the 
city. During the exploratory visit, Tactical Tech 
was able to identify individuals and networks that 
could introduce them to working-class, female or 
trans respondents who would be less comfortable 
communicating in English. Interviews indicated the 
importance of taking an intersectional approach 
to marginalisation (Winker and Degele 2011); 
within this already marginalised community, the 
voices and experiences of working-class people, 
women and trans people tend to be hidden. As 
such, particular efforts were made to include these 
considerations in developing a sample that included 
as many different points of view as possible.
The second objective of the visit was to identify 
networks of local respondents, potential partners 
and peers who could provide access to LGBTQ 
community networks beyond Tactical Tech’s 
existing networks, including points of access to 
reach the more marginalised. Gaining access to 
marginalised groups and building trust is often 
difficult, particularly for outside researchers and 
organisations. In some cases, funded NGOs and 
formalised activist groups are proxies for the wider 
community, and were a point of entry to locate 
marginalised populations. During the pilot visit, 
researchers were able to talk to local respondents 
about the best way of accessing a range of 
respondents; connections made at this time 
allowed us to develop enough trust to access these, 
making for a diverse sample. 
For this study, Tactical Tech partnered with a 
Nairobi-based umbrella organisation of smaller 
organisations throughout the country made up of, 
and / or representing the needs of, LGBTQ people in 
Kenya. The network provided logistical support in 
determining appropriate interview locations, and its 
reputation within the LGBTQ community was helpful 
in identifying potential respondents. However, the 
network was also seen by some as exclusionary 
and not representative of some sections of the 
community. To address this, researchers also met 
respondents through the networks of individuals 
outside the organisation. In this way, they worked 
to ensure adequate representation of all sexual 
orientation, gender identity and class groups.
Sampling and sample
The Kenya case study is based on responses 
from 20 individuals living in Nairobi, Kenya. The 
research did not explicitly ascertain their exact 
identities along the spectrum of LGBTQ, only that 
they closely associated with this broad and diverse 
community, either as individuals in a social network 
or as activists in paid and volunteer capacities. 
Respondents spanned a range of gender identities 
from male to female, were all aged between 18 
and 40, and represented different socio-economic 
classes. The majority worked in voluntary or 
paid capacities in NGOs and LGBTQ coalitions, 
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in addition to part-time work in other jobs; three 
women were college students, but there were also 
lawyers, film-makers, journalists, artists and self-
employed people in the sample.
Analysis is based on data from 20 fieldwork 
interviews. Sixteen formative interviews were also 
conducted, prior to fieldwork, both face-to-face 
in Nairobi and via Internet calls. This research 
was carried out between October 2014 (formative 
interviews) and March 2015 (fieldwork inverviews), 
with analysis and writing conducted between June 
and October 2015.
Limitations of the study
Limited resources prevented primary research 
being conducted outside Nairobi. Although some 
respondents originate from outside Nairobi, and 
all efforts were made to interview a diverse sample 
with varied perceptions, there may be a bias in 
content analysis, with the experience of Nairobi 
residents over-represented. This, combined with 
a small sample size, implies that findings cannot 
be extrapolated for marginalised people outside 
the capital. Despite these limitations, the study 
methodology yielded important empirical insights, 
and the findings can be adopted to inform T4T&A 
interventions.
Research design: South Africa
Desk research
The research team conducted a review of the 
government transparency and accountability, 
T4T&A and ICT4D literatures. They also reviewed 
T4T&A projects in South Africa, and as part of 
the desk research, carried out three telephone / 
Internet call interviews with experts working on 
these issues in South Africa.
Formative interviews
The lead researcher travelled to South Africa 
in January 2015 to interview local experts, to 
shape the research questions and orientate the 
team in the current socio-political context. We 
listened to a range of opinions and experiences 
about technology applications for activism. 
Seven formative interviews were conducted 
during this trip, with an additional three via 
telephone / Internet calls. Respondents worked 
in parliamentary monitoring, citizen media and 
journalism, youth and education issues, housing 
and urban development rights, and freedom of 
access to information projects.
Owing to scheduling issues, most of the formative 
interviews conducted at this stage were with 
people in positions of authority who were relatively 
privileged in terms of class and race. They did 
not reflect the intended sample, and therefore a 
specific effort was made to undertake a sampling 
exercise that would help identify a more diverse 
sample for the study. Nonetheless, some of the 
formative interviews resulted in insights borne 
of rich experiences of working with marginalised 
communities through applications of technology. 
The formative interviews also provided an 
opportunity to meet with a local research assistant 
and identify logistical, operational and security 
considerations for the upcoming research process.
Sampling and sample
In addition to the ten formative interviews 
described above, three more interviews were 
conducted with key female informants as part 
of a sample determination exercise; one of the 
respondents had already been interviewed. 
These three sample-focused formative interviews 
were with:
• a Johannesburg-based white policy activist and 
researcher at a housing and lands rights policy 
organisation
• a Johannesburg-based black T4T&A activist 
living and working in low-income communities
• a Cape Town-based Indian-origin freelance 
security studies researcher and writer associated 
with the Right to Know movement.
These sample-focused formative interviews were to 
determine the range of profiles of activists working 
in housing rights and urban development-related 
social movements. The results helped us identify 
socio-economically and politically marginalised 
organisations and groups, whose protests and 
dissent the government has tried to suppress. 
Weighing responses from our key informants, 
we developed a qualitative sampling strategy 
and purposively selected a range of profiles of 
Johannesburg activists, seeking maximum variation 
in perceptions and lived experiences. To that end, 
mixed purposive sampling approaches were used, 
including:
• extreme-case sampling (identifying the extremes 
or poles of some characteristic and then 
selecting cases representing these extremes for 
examination)
13
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• typical-case sampling (selecting what are 
believed to be average cases)
• critical-case sampling (selecting what are 
believed to be particularly important cases)
• negative-case sampling (selecting cases that 
disconfirm the researcher’s expectations and 
generalisations)
• opportunistic sampling (selecting cases when 
the opportunity arises).
The different kinds of activist communities 
identified through the sampling exercise allowed 
us to ensure that we were indeed reaching out to 
the marginalised, whose voices are rarely heard in 
mainstream media, public debates or government 
policy discourses. We focused mainly on the 
following types of key respondents from working-
class, mass-based movements living in informal 
settlements often far from the city centre, and from 
formal NGOs or academia in Johannesburg’s main 
business district and city centre:
• staff of NGOs and community-based 
organisations (CBOs) working on socio-
economic rights and legal aid
• CBO members
• activists in the housing and socio-economic 
rights movements.
We reached out to several people in each category 
to schedule fieldwork interviews, and received 
nine negative responses, for a range of reasons. 
For the final fieldwork sample, we interviewed 17 
respondents from across all three categories.
Sampling and data collection were strengthened 
by a local research assistant who is well trusted in 
both informal settlement communities and urban 
development NGOs, and who facilitated access to 
marginalised activists for fieldwork interviews in 
secure locations.
Limitations of the study
At the start of each formative and fieldwork 
interview, the researcher followed an informed 
consent process to ensure that respondents 
made a conscious decision on whether or not the 
transcript of their interview would be recorded. 
Eight respondents, concerned about potential 
inadvertent privacy and confidentiality risks, did 
not consent to recording, and these fieldwork 
interviews were documented through note-taking; 
nine consented to their fieldwork interview being 
recorded. Some explained that surreptitious 
recordings of activists speaking in group meetings 
have been later edited out of context, and 
published without consent in the press, attributing 
to them inaccurate and discrediting statements. 
Among the eight who did not consent to digital 
recording for transcription purposes, five were 
marginalised black women activists who have faced 
harassment and threats in the past for speaking out 
against rights violations and oppression.
For the unrecorded fieldwork interviews, detailed 
notes captured key concepts and voluminous 
direct quotes. Still, the results of the content 
analysis and code frequencies could be marginally 
skewed as a result of a dataset that combines 
interview notes with full transcripts. It is unlikely, 
though, that the extent of skewing is substantively 
significant, as the results otherwise are reliable 
and valid given the sampling approach, variation 
in respondent perceptions, and triangulation 
of descriptions relevant to key elements of the 
research questions.
‘Do no harm’ approaches to ethics 
and security in research
One of the key aspects shaping the development 
of this research was the location and identity of 
the implementing organisation. As an organisation 
that has worked with activist communities for 
more than a decade, Tactical Tech is known 
for providing capacity building and training 
workshops around digital campaigning, privacy 
and security. This work has made the organisation 
sensitive to the implications of engaging and 
intervening in a community; therefore, the need 
to maintain relationships over time, in order to 
build and sustain networks, has become a part 
of its core values and practices. As a direct result 
of this, Tactical Tech had pre-existing networks 
of collaboration and trust in Kenya and South 
Africa. It has also been involved in supporting 
the practices of communities of activists around 
the world, in some cases dealing with sensitive 
experiences of safety, security and well-being.
Such an organisation faces ethical considerations 
in the course of research. For example, if 
respondents are discussing risks and threats as an 
active, ongoing situation in an interview, how can 
the researcher use this knowledge without placing 
the respondent at risk? If a respondent mentions 
that she is struggling to manage her social media 
profile and is worried about social censure and 
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6 The complete research reports of each case study spell out the specific logistical steps undertaken as part of the ethical practice 
of doing research in these contexts.
visibility because of social media, how should the 
researcher respond during the interview without 
diluting purpose or introducing bias?
In this research, Tactical Tech also had to consider 
what publishing the findings might mean for (state 
and non-state) adversaries of LGBTQ people. Would 
publication inadvertently expose something about 
LGBTQ digital practices? As a consequence of 
internal and external discussions on these issues, 
this report does not include details that may risk 
exposing local respondents, their organisations and 
networks.
Notley et al. (2015) find that developing an ethical 
framework and principles within which to evaluate 
NGO practices is complex, given the kind of work 
that NGOs do in close collaboration with groups 
over lengthy periods of time. Their action research 
evaluated the impact of video advocacy projects 
within a global network, Video for Change. They 
found that most measures of outreach tend to 
determine impact, whereas the processes and 
practices of video advocacy, participation and 
engagement with communities – and accountability 
to those communities – form a matrix of ethical 
issues in such work. They say:
“This focus on defining the kind of participation 
that matters across the full video-making cycle 
critically differentiates Video for Change from 
more traditional forms of documentary practice, 
which often keep communities and social 
movements at arm’s length, either because 
they do not know how to engage people using 
participatory methods, or they do not value 
participation, or because they feel they want 
to fall in line with more traditional journalistic 
ethics in order to make claims about objectivity” 
(Notley et al. 2015: 10).
For networks like Video for Change and Tactical 
Tech, relationships with communities are not kept 
at an objective distance; the strength of our work 
comes from participation, sharing and engagement. 
Tactical Tech has been funded to provide groups 
like those interviewed in this study with training 
and capacity-building support, and it is part of our 
organisational mandate to provide these services to 
communities around the world. Thus, accountability 
to these organisations and communities constitutes 
part of our ethical practice in this work.
One of the principles which has been used in this 
study and other interventions at Tactical Tech is 
‘do no harm’, a principle that emerged from conflict 
and post-conflict transformation work and is 
relevant to many community-based interventions 
and research. Do no harm involves working 
through the risks and opportunities presented by 
an intervention and prioritising the well-being and 
security of participants. The do no harm principle 
suggests that any intervention becomes part of 
the context it wants to change, and inadvertently 
produces negative impacts alongside the positive 
ones (Anderson 1999). The desire to minimise any 
potential source of harm and to maximise positive 
impacts was a guiding influence that shaped this 
study. In a practitioner setting, this approach – 
perhaps as one of many – serves as an ethical 
guideline in the absence of external ethical review 
boards or committees.
The desire to minimise any potential source of harm 
and to maximise positive impacts was a guiding 
influence that shaped this study. Do no harm 
principles were applied in both research contexts 
in terms of physical and logistical considerations, 
and practices of data collection, management and 
analysis.6
Taking research back to the 
community
Once all the interviews were finished and draft 
versions of the two reports completed, in October 
2015, Tactical Tech organised two day-long 
workshops Nairobi and Johannesburg with the 
communities and partners originally involved in 
the research. The events were organised in order 
to generate interest in the research, and to have 
the communities discuss and review the findings, 
helping to clarify content and verify the analysis. 
They were also an opportunity to bring together 
T4T&A actors in both cities with the members of 
the communities directly involved in the research, 
although many members of the T4T&A community 
were absent, despite invitations. 
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Being LGBTQ in Nairobi: the 
contours of marginalisation
Homosexuality is still very much a taboo subject 
in Kenya. Surveys conducted by the Pew Research 
Center (2013) indicate that 88% of Kenyans 
view homosexuality as unacceptable, 3% find it 
acceptable, and the remaining 9% do not view 
it as a moral issue. This places Kenya among 
the ten countries in the world least accepting 
of homosexuality. LGBTQ people in Nairobi face 
physical violence, ostracism, homophobia, social 
exclusion, and structural and interpersonal 
discrimination. As part of this, the fear of blackmail, 
extortion and entrapment is justifiably high. The 
majority of respondents in this research hide at least 
some aspects of their lives, and the threat of being 
exposed is real and potentially deeply damaging.
LGBTQ people in Nairobi face risks and barriers 
online connected to the barriers and risks they 
experience offline. While all LGBTQ people face 
marginalisation and discrimination in Kenya by 
virtue of the criminalisation of homosexuality, there 
are different levels of marginalisation within the 
community, stratified by ethnicity, class and gender. 
It is perhaps most relevant for those who are 
working class and do not enjoy the safety provided 
by social status and wealth; poverty is the factor 
that connects those respondents who feel most 
marginalised.
However, marginalisation is also particularly relevant 
for lesbian, bisexual and queer (LBQ) women. When 
interviewed, many LBQ women spoke of the Kenyan 
LGBTQ space being dominated by gay men, and 
the relative invisibility they experience, both within 
the movement and in the few safe, public spaces 
that exist. Similarly, a growing trans movement 
has put the issue of trans invisibility and violence 
high on the agenda for the LGBTQ movement. One 
respondent said “everyone wants to see a Kenyan 
lesbian”, implying that both in the mainstream 
media and in activist circles, there exists a high 
degree of exclusion of LBQ women, and a sense that 
Kenyan lesbians might not even exist.
Women respondents perceived LGBTQ issues in 
Kenya as often being framed in terms of the risk 
of HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) infection. 
As a result, men who have sex with men (MSM) 
and gay men are highly visible through a number 
of funded collectives, NGOs, CBOs and events. One 
LBQ respondent who spoke about this asked: “Is 
there one problem that all lesbians face?”, meaning 
that one easily identifiable problem – like the threat 
of infection by HIV – is perhaps what LBQ women 
in Kenya need in order to be visible. The problem 
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‘B’, a 32 year old gay man from Kenya, who fled to South 
Africa in fear of his life.
The problem of invisibility itself is not visible: it lacks a 
particular hook or focus for funding or other supportive efforts.
3. Research results: Kenya
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7 However, one respondent flagged that there are still people, particularly in the slums, who remain outside of the social media 
bubble. While efforts are made on the part of activists and NGOs to reach them, the fact that they are not online can mean that 
they are not even aware that there are communities of people out there who are like them.
of invisibility itself, she said, is not visible: it lacks 
a particular hook or focus for funding or other 
supportive efforts. This invisibility is compounded 
by the fact that, as other LBQ respondents pointed 
out, the fear of violence or negative consequences 
for being visible prevents them from being publicly 
known as LBQ. Recent documentation from Kenya 
(CAL and GALCK Kenya 2016), published after the 
fieldwork for this study was completed, describes 
the extent of violence faced by LBQ women, 
documenting the damaging effects of pervasive, 
structural and social homophobia and sexism. 
Though many LBQ women have been invited to 
speak in mainstream media forums, not one woman 
has chosen to respond, leaving the voice of middle-
class Kenyan gay men to speak for all Kenyan 
queers. LBQ respondents in this sample made it a 
point to mention that for upper-class or wealthier 
LBQ women in Nairobi, who do not have to use 
public transport and can live in fairly homogenous 
and secure environments, the problem of invisibility 
was not the same.
Social media practices and 
perceptions
While a vast majority of people in Kenya have 
mobile phones, the question of access to digital 
technology and social media presents itself in 
multiple and layered ways. Airtime is relatively 
cheap, but phones themselves may not be, and 
laptops and tablets remain out of reach for many 
people. Digital literacy is also an issue; the question 
is not just about having a phone or smartphone, 
but also how a person uses it, what they know 
about how it functions, whether they have the 
knowledge to make informed decisions about 
how to use it effectively and to feel sure of what is 
safe and what is not. Despite low digital literacy, 
respondents have evolved specific responses to 
managing and mitigating the threats they face.
Given the criminalisation and high level of 
marginalisation that the LGBTQ community faces in 
Kenya, both from the state and from society, there 
is a tension between the necessity of maintaining 
individual anonymity in activism, and developing a 
visible community in resistance to the invisibility of 
LGBTQ people in Kenyan society.
Fieldwork interviews showed that social media, 
primarily Facebook, was the most used and 
accessible online space for the LGBTQ community, 
where “everyone is connected – low income or high 
income”.7 Social media serves not just to connect 
people, but also to provide space for knowledge 
sharing and support. One respondent reported that 
“every day we pose a question [online] – whether 
it’s on substance abuse, violence, trauma from 
assault or whatever queer women in general are 
going through. We have created visibility that way.”
However, while the use of social media is 
widespread, nearly all respondents maintain two 
accounts on Facebook because of high levels of 
lateral surveillance: a ‘straight’ account using their 
real name, where they connect with their family, 
straight friends and church community; and a 
queer account under an adopted name where they 
connect with others in the LGBTQ community. The 
use of an adopted queer name is widespread and 
may be used in offline contexts too – particularly 
while establishing trust in new relationships. 
Nevertheless, the two accounts can result in 
dangerous situations; respondents described being 
accidentally outed to their families after being 
tagged under their real name in a photo attending 
a LGBTQ gathering. Cases of surveillance also 
include family members actively seeking out queer 
accounts to expose users.
Having two accounts requires a considerable 
degree of management and negotiation. LGBTQ 
Kenyans often use their adopted Facebook names 
“Every day we pose a question [online] – whether it’s 
on substance abuse, violence, trauma from assault – 
whatever queer women … are going through. We have 
created visibility that way.”
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both in the online and offline contexts within 
the LGBTQ community; someone who meets a 
Facebook friend offline will only refer to them by 
their adopted name, not actually knowing the 
person’s real name. But LGBTQ individuals who 
come across the ‘straight’ account of an LGBTQ 
friend often will not add them as a connection. 
Harry explained: “I’ve seen my queer friends have 
two accounts, and I’ve gotten to see their straight 
account. I usually don’t add their straight account 
because they haven’t added me on it.” 
While the online world offers freedom as well as 
risks, respondents in the sample indicate that 
they create their own risk mitigation measures. 
These included particular methods for managing 
visual images online, captioning and tagging of 
visuals, admitting people into social media groups, 
and verifications of identity for admittance to 
parties. Some respondents indicated a careful 
use of privacy mechanisms. For example, Thomas 
said that LGBTQ people will not put photos of 
themselves as their profile pictures, that queer 
accounts more often have “pictures of random 
people, like Rihanna or whoever. You don’t use your 
face on that account.”
The use of multiple social media accounts to 
escape exposure finds a parallel in Pakistan. Emrys 
Schoemaker finds a practice of multiple social 
media accounts among lower-middle income men 
and women in smaller towns in Pakistan where a 
practice of ‘digital purdah’ is used by men with 
two Facebook accounts to ‘protect their culture’; 
two accounts allow them to have one for male 
friends outside the family, and another account for 
family members (Schoemaker 2015). The rationale 
for these two accounts is that they do not want 
pictures of their female family members accessible 
to men outside the family. Women who are already 
segregated and in purdah actually remain there 
in the online world. So having two accounts, in 
both the Kenyan and Pakistani contexts, concerns 
people selectively hiding and revealing themselves 
because of social norms and values. However, this 
revealing and hiding only serves to maintain the 
status quo: both the Pakistani women who have 
been veiled, and the Kenyan LGBTQ people who 
have been closeted, remain hidden.
The tension between anonymity and visibility 
is not just about being seen or not being seen. 
Visibility and anonymity take on different meanings 
depending on the context in which the digital is 
being used. LGBTQ people experience the digital 
both as personal individuals and as engaged, 
political actors and activists. There is a desire for 
personal anonymity to the hostile outside world, 
and visibility in participating in the local LGBTQ 
community; at the same time, there is a desire 
for visibility as a community and for LGBTQ rights 
through the medium of the digital, at the same 
time as a need for privacy as a community when it 
comes to offline events and activities.
However, the study shows that anonymity is difficult 
to maintain. It demands attention and a constant 
awareness of the leakage of digital traces – through 
changes in the settings of social media platforms, 
and through the actions or inactions of others – 
and how these may put a user at risk of exposure. 
The social media platforms where these different 
states play out are unable to contain the shifting 
positions and needs of individuals to use and 
manage the technology they have access to.
Discussion of social media platforms was 
dominated by Facebook. Twitter, for instance, is 
not as popular as platforms which connect only 
friends and known groups; it is perceived as being 
a tool to connect with communities that are global, 
and thus less interesting to the LGBTQ community 
here. Active Twitter use was mentioned by only 
one respondent, an activist working for a NGO and 
engaged in national, regional and international 
discussions on gender and sexuality rights. For 
others working in NGOs, Twitter was occasionally 
used to publish organisational updates.
Using T4T&A tools to report 
violence
LGBTQ people interviewed in this study listed 
experiences of facing interpersonal violence, which 
they attribute to being socially ostracised and 
marginalised: ostracism or estrangement from family, 
street harassment for appearing different, bullying, 
assault, eviction from housing, public humiliation 
and shaming, corrective blackmail, extortion, 
sexual harassment at the workplace, and coercive 
sex. The threat of physical violence and attacks on 
LGBTQ NGO offices have led respondents to employ 
strategies to secure their physical spaces through the 
use of closed-circuit television at office entrances, 
physical security, sign-in / sign-out books, and so on.
The scale and extent of this violence in a climate 
where there is no recognition of LGBTQ people’s 
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rights makes reporting it extremely difficult. Study 
respondents said that there is no point in talking 
about these incidents or attempting to address 
them, because they do not trust any institution 
or individual to actually respond positively. Could 
anything come of reporting violence? The rest of 
this section describes the origins and reception of 
Utunzi and Speak Out, two T4T&A applications to 
report on violence faced by LGBTQ people.
Utunzi
Two Nairobi-based developers wanted to do 
something to support the LGBTQ community 
because of its relative invisibility in Kenyan society, 
and the fact that violence and discrimination 
against LGBTQ people often goes unseen or 
unnoticed because of a lack of empirical evidence. 
So they developed Utunzi, a crowdmap to report 
violence. Several hundred individuals submitted 
reports to the platform during Utunzi’s initial 
launch, but after this early interest the number of 
reports dwindled significantly. When investigating 
why individuals are not likely to use such a 
platform, several key issues emerged.
No connection with the community
LGBTQ people sampled for this study – that is, 
potential users of Utunzi – were not even aware 
that it existed. There was limited sensitisation or 
capacity building within the LGBTQ community on 
how the platform works, or about why reporting 
violations against LGBTQ people is necessary. 
So, even if the tool was known, there were 
no mechanisms through which to engage the 
community and popularise the tool. Jeremy says:
“In an ideal world, it’s best that it has 
organisations’ complete buy-in. Like right now 
I have a case, which I should have reported to 
Utunzi, but I didn’t report it … because I don’t 
even know if it exists anymore. So we need 
to have a space where people can know that 
immediately [when] you post something in this 
space, a solution comes on board. Even if it’s 
someone who is coming up with a tool, engage 
the organisations in developing it. And let them 
understand this is a space, then they will take 
up the responsibility to take it to the community 
members and tell them.”
However, the developers and people associated 
with the project insist that there was discussion 
with the LGBTQ community. It is possible that the 
sample of respondents interviewed here were not 
connected to the developers or involved in their 
discussions with the LGBTQ community about the 
development of Utunzi. 
LGBTQ respondents in this case study were asked 
about their awareness of Nairobi’s thriving non-
profit and social justice technology community; 
it was found that there was almost uniformly no 
awareness of this work or community. Through 
the research, and in the workshop held to share 
findings, it emerged that there was little or no 
connection between LGBTQ communities and the 
T4T&A communities. There is, generally, limited 
support for NGOs and activists in their use of 
technology.
Also, LGBTQ respondents do not feel they have 
access to skilled and sensitive people that they 
can turn to for inexpensive solutions and support 
to meet their tech needs. For example, a member 
of a LBQ women’s art collective in Nairobi said 
that simple tech support to build a website that 
would not be trolled or defaced in any way was 
not available; they could pay for a commercial 
web developer if they had the money, but were 
uncomfortable sharing sensitive information such 
as administrative access to their infrastructure to 
someone who could be homophobic.
An easier interface and accessibility
As a web-based platform, Utunzi required 
individuals to use a computer, introducing an 
entry-level barrier. While many individuals in 
Kenya have a phone with a data plan, computer 
ownership rates remain low. Several respondents 
suggested that an app-based tool would be more 
effective and have higher uptake than a web-
Individuals did not necessarily trust that the data 
they were submitting in a report would be used for 
the purposes stated on the website.
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8 A popular mobile money transfer service in Kenya.
based platform. Respondents also found the 
tool complicated, and said they need something 
easier. “For us it’s too complex. It needs to be 
simplified. As simple as possible. Not all of us 
are technologically ‘chop-chop’. It’s simplifying it. 
WhatsApp is very simple. You type something and 
it’s done.” Activists in this sample recommended 
a mobile app or an app-based hotline where users 
were not required to access a website, and could 
get an immediate response to an immediate crisis.
Low trust
Respondents in this sample said that there was a 
significant issue of trust associated with this, and 
similar platforms. The issue of trust plays out in the 
following ways.
Individuals did not necessarily trust that the 
data they were submitting in a report would be 
used for the purposes stated on the website. 
Despite security measures put in place by 
platform developers, respondents felt that they 
did not know that data would be communicated 
securely. There was little indication of a known 
or trustworthy organisation behind the platform 
and, due to a culture of social stigmatisation, 
blackmail and extortion of the LGBTQ community, 
many people do not feel secure in sharing 
personal details. Alfie stated: “People are also very 
reluctant to post. This is because of the fear of 
backlash. If I post there and my friend who’s not 
gay sees, what will happen? He or she might start 
rejecting me. People are afraid the information 
might get out.”
Similarly, another respondent, Grace, stated:
“I know somebody who went through some sort 
of ... bad stuff happened to her and I tried to 
convince her to report it both using a tool and 
also to police but she was not willing to do it. I 
honestly don’t know why. Maybe they’re afraid 
that information will get somewhere out ... It’s 
virtual ... by the time you get there it’s already 
done. Nothing happens after that information is 
collected. It’s put in a basket. People feel like, 
what’s the point of doing it?”
Respondents indicated a general sense of distrust 
with any kind of app or platform, with the exception 
of M-Pesa,8 and an overwhelming sense of 
scepticism for platforms addressing socio-political 
issues in Kenya. This finds resonance in a recent 
Global Consumer Trust Report, which found that 
in Kenya and other parts of Africa, user trust has 
declined in downloading and using apps because of 
the lack of protection for personal information and 
the threat of malware (MEF 2014).
Although it was actually independently developed 
by two local technologists, only receiving support 
from an international organisation during its 
second phase of redevelopment, Utunzi was 
assumed by respondents to be funded by an 
international NGO. Many said that they were 
suspicious of the motivations and actions of 
international NGOs that engaged a community in a 
new project without anything positive accruing for 
individuals or the community. During the research 
we heard respondents asking what the benefits of 
participating in a research project would be for them 
or their community, on more than one occasion.
Respondents said that those people who did submit 
reports to Utunzi – who overcame the obstacles of 
access, trust and awareness – did not receive any 
response from NGOs or platform administrators. 
When people did hear back, it was often many 
days later, long after the emergency had been 
addressed elsewhere. It is not surprising that 
responses were delayed; Utunzi was not structured 
as an emergency-response platform, even though 
users thought it was. So, there was a fundamental 
misconception about the purpose of this crowdmap. 
The lack of response from NGOs and organisations 
maintaining Utunzi further damaged trust in this 
platform. One respondent likened the platform to 
desks at police stations for reporting gender-based 
violence: a good idea in theory but not in practice. 
While present at all police stations, ‘gender desks’ 
are seldom used due to victims feeling that police 
do not take reports seriously or do not adequately 
follow incidents up after they have been reported.
Utunzi repurposed
The Utunzi example indicates that if the violence 
faced by LGBTQ people were to be addressed 
through a crowdmap, it would require far more 
engagement with the community and its networks; 
interfaces need to be easy to navigate and there 
needs to be an assurance of impact and beneficial 
outcomes for individuals. These learnings were 
shared with a funding organisation that implements 
projects for and with LGBTQ networks in Kenya. 
At the time of conducting fieldwork in Nairobi, a 
fieldwork interview was conducted with the project 
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9 ‘Speak out’ is not the real name of the platform. Information requests about the service can be directed to Maya Ganesh at 
Tactical Tech.
manager, George, who works at an international 
donor agency that is managing the redevelopment of 
Utunzi, and has a history of working in LGBTQ NGOs. 
The donor organisation George works for has 
been supporting an emergency response project 
for coalitions serving LGBTQ communities on the 
border with Uganda. Following the criminalisation 
and active persecution of LGBTQ people there, 
there has been increased vigilance and anxiety on 
the part of Kenyan LGBTQ groups. This work, and 
reports from LGBTQ people in Nairobi, indicated 
a need for a coordinated emergency response to 
address the violence the community was facing and 
reporting. Emergency requirements in these cases 
include medical services, legal aid and psycho-social 
support and counselling. 
When it became clear that Utunzi was not working 
as a crowdmap for individuals to report violence, 
George and his colleagues took a decision to make 
it a specialised site for sending reports of violence 
to a network of vetted first responders. According 
to George, these revisions in Utunzi were intended 
to create an efficient response, not necessarily 
a direct response. Although the phone number 
called from or the Internet protocol (IP) address 
from which an online report is sent are logged, the 
full report of the case is not stored on the site’s 
servers. Information about a case will be carefully 
documented. The case will be verified by whoever 
within the network of first responders receives the 
call, to make sure it is legitimate. There is a roster 
of first responders, so if one cannot respond for 
some reason, there are others who can take on the 
case. Other changes to Utunzi include:
• a focus on a specific region, with attention 
directed to supporting responders there
• cases are documented more thoroughly, and 
data are analysed every month.
The story of Utunzi offers some valuable lessons, 
the simplest and most critical of these being that 
technology applications for a community need 
to be developed in consultation with them and in 
response to their needs.
Speak out
One of the other T4T&A projects that emerged from 
the Nairobi case study was ‘Speak Out’,9 a platform 
comprising a Facebook page and a Twitter feed. 
It was started by an individual whose identity is 
known to the LGBTQ community in Nairobi, but who 
was not interviewed for the research. Thus, this 
research reflects on Speak Out through interviews 
with its users and supporters. Speak Out was 
developed through technical support and strategic 
development with an international NGO and 
therefore is not as entirely ‘homegrown’ as some 
respondents described it. 
Closeted MSM (men who have sex with men) and 
gay men are particularly vulnerable to blackmail 
and extortion. The internet – social media, dating 
sites and mobile dating apps like Grindr – is a 
popular way for MSM and gay men to meet each 
other away from the gaze of mainstream society. 
Blackmailers and extortionists also spend time 
on these sites posing as potential dates, sexual 
partners or lovers. It is common practice to talk 
for a while online, sharing seemingly benign yet 
sensitive personal information such as occupation, 
address, personal details before meeting in 
person. Meeting in person is considered to be more 
revealing; graduated anonymity is considered to 
be a protective mechanism that closeted gay men 
/ MSM have employed for their own security.
However, this is an instance of a security tactic that 
can backfire: blackmailers use this extended period 
of online communication to extract information 
about a gay man / MSM. When blackmailers (often 
part of an organised gang) believe they have 
enough information, they reveal their real intention: 
extortion. They threaten to out the individual to his 
family or employer unless they pay. Respondents 
described their friends (never themselves) as 
sometimes being caught in the act as blackmailers 
burst into the room, or out of the closet, taking 
photos on a phone. These photos and the online 
exchanges are used as leverage for blackmail.
One human rights lawyer interviewed here who 
represents LGBTQ people said that the most 
common cases they get are of blackmail, and that 
being underground and closeted is extremely 
dangerous for gay men / MSM. Those gay men 
/ MSM who are open about their sexuality are 
less likely to be blackmailed, although it is not 
uncommon to face other forms of discrimination 
and /or violence.
Thus the approach of Speak Out is simple: given 
the scale of blackmail and extortion suffered, 
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particularly within the closeted gay community, 
Speak Out serves to expose the extortionists. 
Described as an online platform to monitor human 
rights abuses against sexual and gender minorities, 
Speak Out invites people to submit the names 
and addresses, handles and online aliases of 
blackmailers and extortionists which, after careful 
verification, are then published on Speak Out’s 
pages as a warning system for other closeted gay 
men. Speak Out also verifies and documents cases 
of violence against the LGBTQ community. It is 
well respected within that community and by the 
respondents. It serves as a symbol of resistance 
that is based on familiar, known platforms and 
provides an active service to the community, 
allowing them to secure their own online and 
offline spaces.
Conclusions
Both Utunzi and Speak Out offer valuable insights 
into how the development and uptake of T4T&A 
projects have occurred in this community. Both 
were imagined as a response to the struggle to 
manage visibility and anonymity. In the case of 
Utunzi, a crowdmap was used to make violence 
visible, and this visibility was assumed to be key 
in claim for rights and acceptance in Kenyan 
society; however, the development of the project 
needed more investment in user research and 
the context of uptake by the LGBTQ community. 
Speak Out works in the opposite way, to 
expose the perpetrators of violence through 
the productive use of the online exchanges and 
materials that are used to extort and harass a 
vulnerable community.
Speak out serves as a symbol of resistance that is based 
on familiar, known platforms and provides an active 
service to the community, allowing them to secure their 
own online and offline spaces.
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4. Research results: South Africa
This section presents results from the case 
study of how marginalised communities in 
South Africa engage with technology, and 
what inhibits them from using T4T&A tools. 
The findings are from fieldwork interviews with 
activists working on housing, land and urban 
development rights in Johannesburg, South 
Africa. This work is described here alongside a 
set of formative interviews in Cape Town, held 
five months prior to the fieldwork, with activists, 
lawyers and academics working on similar issues. 
Both the formative interviews and the fieldwork 
interviews presented diverse and rich insights into 
technology usage and applications across a broad 
continuum of actors; it is for this reason that they 
are presented here together, and both inform the 
analysis of the findings from South Africa. 
The results describe the particular instance of 
how communities of activists use Freedom of 
Information Act requests to obtain ‘the housing 
list’, and what this means for a broader view of 
T4T&A activities. They also describe how low-
income communities use technologies in mobilising 
and organising, and the issues of trust, violence 
and marginalisation that emerge from this.
The landscape of activism
In the landscape of South African activism and 
engagement with housing and urban development 
issues, a rich tapestry of this country’s history 
of struggle emerges. One of the findings from 
the formative interviews is that within the social 
movement for housing and urban development 
rights, activists can be clustered according to their 
socio-economic status, age and location, reflecting 
differing histories of privilege and oppression. This 
grouping helps contextualise diverse activists’ 
perceptions of the uses and practices of technology 
in their daily lives and activism. Both the formative 
and fieldwork interviews served to define the 
different kinds of actors in this space, which include: 
‘NGO activists’, ‘legal NGOs’, ‘urban development 
NGOs’, ‘housing researchers’, ‘old-school land 
rights and housing activists’ (as opposed to 
A drone-mapping image of Kya Sands informal settlement (right) and Bloubosrand suburb, Gauteng, illustrating the spatial 
dynamics of housing inequality in Johannesburg, South Africa.
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‘younger activists’), ‘mass-base NGOs’, ‘community 
development forums’ and ‘building committees’.
What this diversity of actors implies is that 
the practices, uses, risks and barriers of using 
technology are specific to each group, serving 
different functions in each case. The class, racial, 
ethnic and gender backgrounds of individual 
activists determine what their engagement with 
technology and activism is, and what sorts of 
approaches they will adopt. Those who work in 
formal NGOs engaged in ‘development’ in the 
urban setting position themselves and function 
quite differently from those in working-class 
movements based in informal settlements. The 
sample also includes older and younger activists, 
and the most distinctive aspect of this age divide 
is that the older activists all have a history of 
being involved in anti-apartheid struggles, which 
shapes their perceptions and practices concerning 
technology use. 
Respondents noted distinctions between their two 
cities, saying very pointedly technology projects 
and data-based advocacy manifest differently 
in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Johannesburg 
respondents perceived NGO activists in Cape 
Town, many of whom are white, to be more data 
savvy and technologically advanced, and to be 
using open data. 
Two linked interactions during the formative 
interview stage of the research revealed some of 
these differences in geography, race and class. 
In Cape Town, a Right to Know advocate said in a 
formative interview that “secrecy has destroyed 
South Africa ... We need to end secrecy and 
everyone and everything should be transparent … 
No one should be invisible … Privacy should only 
be for journalists and their sources who need to 
be protected.” When pushed to clarify, he said that 
he believed that privacy was not essential to other 
activists.
This quote, with the identity of the source 
withheld, was presented to a different respondent 
in a formative interview. The respondent in 
this interview was a black woman activist 
in Johannesburg, a passionate champion of 
applications of technology for social justice. She 
told her story of coming from an impoverished 
province and working to expose corruption and 
injustice. Her house was burnt down for blogging 
about campaigns against corporations; she has 
been threatened for writing about whistle-blowers. 
She was scathing about the idea of complete 
transparency. “Complete transparency is a nice 
idea for white men in the suburbs ... Whiteness 
protects people in South Africa and it is a white 
lens through which this idea of transparency is 
seen. It is also a gendered lens … I need to speak 
anonymously sometimes.”
These divisions were not necessarily discussed 
in a negative sense; rather, respondents used 
them as a way of pointing out that it is important 
not to view either activists or movements as 
monolithic, and that T4T&A activities must be 
sure to engage with the right kind of actors. 
If they do not, there is the risk of launching 
activities in communities that are not well 
resourced, and do not have either the capacity 
or the support to engage in activities.
The housing list: applying T4T&A in 
movements and communities
South Africa has a progressive constitution that 
guarantees housing to its citizens, along with the 
right to services, to not be evicted, and to be free 
of arbitrary searches that were common during 
apartheid. However, while the state is responsible 
for providing housing for its citizens, it falls short of 
meeting this responsibility. According to academic 
Marie Huchzermeyer (2013), the 2013 UN Habitat 
report ranks Johannesburg as the world’s most 
unequal city, and the number of shacks and 
informal settlements is only continuing to grow. 
During apartheid, communities were forcibly 
removed from their places of residence and had to 
live with others of the same race. While the post-
apartheid era has brought de jure equality to South 
Africans, the state’s neoliberal policies continue to 
sustain economic inequalities, particularly across 
racial lines. In South Africa, the state has failed 
to provide housing or do away with corruption, 
and there is a lack of transparency in housing 
allocation, spatial inequality, an absence of pro-
poor planning and insecurity of tenure.
Three of the formative interviews discussed ‘the 
housing list’, which describes the schedule and 
order of housing allocations, and is considered 
to be a kind of holy grail for housing-rights 
activists because it can be used to monitor the 
state practice in allocating housing to citizens. 
These interviews highlighted the structural and 
philosophical issues about applying technological 
tools to support housing claims. 
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The housing list is particularly relevant and 
important for households and whole communities 
that have been evicted (‘temporarily relocated’) 
and must wait for permanent housing to be allotted 
to them. Lawyers working with such communities in 
Cape Town use paper-based freedom of information 
requests, known as PAIAs (Promotion of Access to 
Information Act), both to identify when they can 
expect to be relocated and as a pressure tactic on 
the state that keeps them in temporary housing, 
sometimes for as long as ten years. The Right to 
Know movement is an active partner in this. 
One of the three respondents, a lawyer, said: “The 
understanding around housing delivery is that 
there is a ‘waiting list system’ which constitutes 
a housing queue, and that people must wait 
patiently until their name comes up in terms of 
a rational process of ‘first come, first served’ … 
This is why the list is important.” Once the list is 
finally made available, however, people find their 
names and details of new housing on it, but they 
also find that the actual process of allocation does 
not proceed rationally or logically. The respondent 
continues: “People have been on waiting lists, 
but their homes never materialise, or people who 
came after them [on the list] get houses first. 
So the focus tends to be on the immediate need 
(rightfully so), but at the expense of sustainably 
or meaningfully addressing the problem of 
housing ... The list isn’t everything.” Research 
from the Socio-Economic Research Institute of 
South Africa (Tissington et al. 2013) finds that 
the housing list and its promises of ordered and 
equitable allocation are a myth because of the 
array of opaque policies and bureaucratic details 
surrounding the list itself, which impede housing 
allocation, and government corruption.
Respondents shared the learning that mechanisms 
to access information are just one, early stage in 
the process of housing allocation, but that they 
need to be integrated into campaigning, or used 
as a piece of a broader advocacy strategy. “Access 
is one thing, but then what?” asked another 
respondent, also a lawyer, before going on to point 
out that the step after access is legibility. This 
refers to the ability to make information part of 
a campaign, to use it strategically as leverage in 
engaging with a bureaucracy, and to understand 
how it works and where it comes from. There are 
people who know how to do this, and those who 
do not: the respondent described the difference 
between them as a “data divide”. 
Formative interviews underlined the importance 
of distinguishing between “intermediaries” who 
are considered to be more adept in the use of 
technologies, and “communities” who are seen as 
being on the “receiving end” of T4T&A applications 
and activities.
When communities do have access to information 
with which to hold the government to account, the 
respondents discussed how it is difficult for them to 
engage with or negotiate with government actors: 
“Even if people do get access to technology and 
the information they need, they don’t really know 
how to engage with power.” To illustrate her point, 
this respondent took out her notepad and drew 
two circles on the opposite ends of the page. She 
labelled one ‘state’ and the other ‘community’. 
Within the circle representing the community, 
she drew some smaller circles. “Communities 
have gatekeepers, power centres,” she said, of 
these smaller circles. “How they make sense of 
information and technology is crucial.” She then 
drew even smaller circles, between state and 
community but closer to community, and labelled 
them ‘intermediaries’. “There is the mistaken 
assumption,” she said, “that putting some wires 
between states and communities will have them 
talking to each other.” She went on to note that for 
a community engaging with the state through its 
bureaucrats and functionaries, there is a learning 
curve to “talking with and through” data and 
technology. 
These two respondents also stated that there are 
assumptions underlying how a community will 
use the information and technology it has access 
to. If there is a data exchange with the state – 
perhaps taking the form of spreadsheets, maps, 
short message service texts (SMSs), statements or 
visuals – data is assumed to be something rational, 
that will be understood in a rational manner. But, 
said one respondent, “data only reveals patterns, 
and there is no piece of data that a community 
can actually use. It has to be made sense of by 
someone for them … Who is this someone?”
This particular interaction must be read as a 
distillation of reflections from an intermediary 
support organisation working with low-income 
and marginalised communities, over a number 
of years, based on the use of different tools and 
information to hold local government to account. 
The interaction articulates the need for a theory 
of change to accompany the application of T4T&A 
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tools in community work, as well as highlighting 
the importance of recognising the dynamics of 
different communities and movements.
There are examples of successful collaborations 
across different communities to learn from. For 
example, formative interview respondents referenced 
a strong example of collaboration, the Our Toilets 
Are Dirty mobile phone-based social audit of toilets 
in Khayelitsha township in Cape Town (Ukwazi 
2014). This was significant because people 
associated with the audit felt that the collaboration 
was positive and beneficial, and there was an 
application of technology that was inclusive.10
Technology practices among 
marginalised activists in Johannesburg
The fieldwork interviews in Johannesburg – with 
17 activists who are from, or working with, low-
income housing rights and urban development 
organisations – resulted in information about their 
technology use and practices, and the limitations 
and barriers they face in using technology. 
Mobile phones were reported to be the most 
widely used device for activism and community 
development work. However, airtime tariffs are 
particularly high in South Africa and only 62% of 
South Africans use a mobile every day; far fewer, 
just 22%, report using the Internet on a daily basis 
(de Lanerolle 2012). This is compounded by the 
fact that to get a mobile, it is necessary to have a 
registered address and identification, which poses 
a large barrier to undocumented migrants from 
neighbouring countries. Some respondents from 
NGOs viewed mobile phone use as “ubiquitous”, 
but responses from local community activists 
suggested otherwise.
The same factors which place mobiles out of reach 
for some community members, place computers 
and tablets even further out of reach, particularly 
on an individual level. Instead, computers are 
associated with offices and tend to be used more 
in the context of NGOs than community activism. 
Computers may be accessed for specific purposes, 
such as research or emailing, but this is likely 
to require a trip into the city centre to an NGO 
office or Internet cafe. And access, even in this 
limited sense, is shaped along lines of gender and 
age. Email has very low levels of uptake in the 
activist community and is used more for official 
communication than for informal communications 
within a social group.
While mobile use might be prevalent among 
activists themselves, members of low-income 
communities, especially women, have very limited 
access to mobiles; in some cases, women must ask 
community leaders – mostly men – to make calls for 
them, even in emergencies. Furthermore, unreliable 
electricity supply can mean that people are unable 
to charge their phones. Nevertheless, poorer, black 
activists often use phones to allow them to conduct 
meetings from afar, to avoid having to travel into 
the city centre, saving time and money. Voice calls, 
SMS and WhatsApp are the most used features for 
activism and organising, as well as to listen to and 
participate in local radio shows.
WhatsApp is favoured by activists as it uses 
minimal data, and group chat features make it 
appealing for social organising and mobilising. It 
is also ‘reshaped’ for uses it was never created for, 
such as recording the minutes of group meetings 
and creating virtual newsrooms.
Police that monitor these activist communities are 
aware that WhatsApp is popular and central to 
activists’ organising. Some respondents report that 
police claim to have intercepted activists’ WhatsApp 
messages and have told them so, resulting in a fear 
of surveillance. However, local experts claim that 
the police do not have the technical capacity for 
WhatsApp interception, and are only saying so to 
intimidate activists and obscure the fact that they rely 
on informants, which is not unusual in South Africa. 
A theme that emerged in discussions of the use 
of WhatsApp is that it is a space where movement 
dynamics and hierarchies are reinforced. Women 
activists talked about how community WhatsApp 
groups are used to make sexist or harassing 
comments. Community group leaders also use 
WhatsApp to play power games with senior leaders, 
publicly shaming them. This makes it difficult 
for other activists to engage, because they are 
reluctant to voice their opinions in group chats due 
to the fear of public shaming.
Neither Facebook or Twitter were popular with this 
activist community. The cost of data is an issue and 
neither of these platforms were thought to be essential.
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Risks of and barriers to using T4T&A 
tools
Cost is one of the primary issues inhibiting our 
respondents’ use of technology. When asking about 
T4T&A applications, one respondent said “people 
would rather have airtime to contact you in an 
emergency than use it to report corruption”. 
Language is another issue. Respondents from 
low-income communities said that social media 
and T4T&A platforms tend to be predominantly 
in English, as well as perhaps Afrikaans and Zulu, 
but in a nation with 11 national languages, and 
where socio-economic divisions have implications 
for education and literacy, this can exclude large 
communities. 
Third, and linked to educational disparities and age, 
is the issue of digital literacy. Low digital literacy 
acts both in barring people from using tools as 
effectively as possible, and in preventing them from 
being able to assess the risks and possibilities of a 
particular tool.
Respondents reported that violence occurs as a 
result of activists’ work being politically challenging 
and sensitive, and includes verbal and sexual 
harassment, physical attack, sexual assault, theft 
and destruction of data and devices, blackmail, 
and surveillance. According to the findings of this 
study, all forms of violence, including psychological, 
physical, sexual, economic and state-perpetrated, 
continue to affect black South Africans 
disproportionately.
Police monitoring, crowd control and the excessive 
use of force against black working-class residents 
of Johannesburg’s informal settlements, continue 
to reduce activists’ capacities to participate 
securely in protest actions. A black male activist 
explained that police or informants may monitor 
activist events and “take steps to prevent the 
march, or sabotage the march, or try to prevent the 
march by harassing organisers, arresting them on 
spurious grounds, taking them out, or whatever”. 
Black activists in the informal settlements also 
expressed feeling mostly powerless to protect 
themselves in protests due to gaping power 
disparities between themselves and the police, 
noting repeatedly that they only have stones to try 
to protect themselves when a protest turns violent, 
while the police have guns and other firearms, and 
use them against protesters.
South African activists’ concerns about ‘lateral 
surveillance’ (Andrejevic 2005) have to do with 
the fear of intimate partners, family, friends, 
comrades and informants infiltrating activist 
groups. One black South African male activist 
spoke about how some activists use intentional 
misinformation in WhatsApp groups to prevent 
police infiltrators or criminals from joining their 
demonstrations. While no respondent offered 
examples of actual instances that infiltration 
had occurred, many voiced fears that it could 
happen. One black male activist respondent gave 
the hypothetical situation of “venting my anger 
through WhatsApp or Facebook, then someone 
else with his / her own intention, having access 
to this [finger snap], can expose me that I’m in a 
very unstable marriage, and stuff like that”. Lateral 
surveillance of his personal communications 
could be used by infiltrators to discredit him as a 
movement leader. 
Fears of surveillance tend to be stronger among 
the older generation, particularly those in black 
and mixed race and poorer communities who 
experienced high levels of surveillance first-hand 
during the anti-apartheid resistance. Younger 
respondents and those working in NGOs tended 
to view digital risks more in terms of privacy 
than security. Fears of online surveillance push 
some younger activists to re-adopt ‘old-school’ 
techniques, including having sensitive meetings 
and conversations in offline spaces.
Black women activists raised issues of sexual 
predation and harassment, not only by police and 
state authorities, but also in the CSOs where they 
work. A black woman activist who is well connected 
The cost of airtime inhibits the use of T4T&A tools: 
“People would rather have airtime to contact you in an 
emergency than use it to report corruption.”
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11 Respondents were referring specifically to a project by Code for South Africa and Ndifuna Ukwazi to use mobile phones to 
report broken toilets in the Cape Town township of Khayelitsha. The toilets were paid for by the government and were 
supposed to be maintained through local government support. The project encouraged citizens to report on broken toilets so 
that the information could be taken back to the government.
to different communities in Johannesburg – from 
city-based development NGOs to slum-based 
popular movements – said that women working 
in CBOs, movement groups, networks and NGOs 
face daily risks of gender-based violence. Black 
and low-income women are more at risk, with 
fewer resources to respond to and recover from 
incidences of violence.
In more conservative rural areas, women activists 
reported facing retaliation and social ostracism 
when reporting corruption, particularly whistle-
blowing about land and housing allocation fraud. 
One black woman activist explained that “as a 
woman, to be outspoken can be so complicated. 
And also to implicate a man in corruption, you 
would be shunned.” She explained that traditional 
community leaders are sometimes in collusion with 
government officials or private sector companies 
in giving away land and selling houses meant 
for internally displaced people. For a woman to 
speak out against a man, and particularly one 
quite senior and respected within the community, 
was fraught with risk of serious repercussions. 
Women activists on community-based and activist 
WhatsApp groups tend to move from one-on-
one chats to group chats due to receiving sexist 
comments from male activists in a one-on-one 
forum. Thus, there tends to be a perception 
that while WhatsApp is a useful organising and 
mobilising tool, it does not foster debate or 
discussion within a community.
A lack of trust
Trust, or the lack thereof, emerged as a theme that 
appears that impede the work of communities and 
movements. This is multifaceted. One aspect of this 
relates to the fact that people do not necessarily 
trust that the information they submit to a platform 
– such as, for example, a a platform for reporting 
broken toilets – will be handled in a way that is 
secure, transparent and free from corruption – or 
that it will actually have any visible impact.11
Respondents also articulated the absence of 
trust in the government to respond to them, or 
that they will ever receive the basic services they 
deserve; they even described a lack of trust in 
their own movements and fellow activists. For 
example, their concerns include local government 
ward councillors’ duties and abuses managing 
administrative lists of government-provided 
housing applications: respondents felt there is 
corruption and opacity in the allocation of housing. 
Additionally, low-income respondents said that 
they do not trust that city and state authorities will 
respond in a timely manner, report corruption, or 
call for emergency help. Black activists interviewed 
here and living in informal settlements estimated 
that an ambulance might come only three or four 
times out of ten. They explained that they think 
emergency services workers are afraid to enter the 
settlements due to stereotyped media coverage 
of residents as troublemakers and criminals using 
gratuitous violence.
Trust issues emerged in a different form for low-
income respondents who had experienced the 
violent legacies of apartheid, and who continue to 
participate in the complex, ongoing, nationwide 
struggle to fashion a post-apartheid South Africa. 
For older members of this sample, this history puts 
them in a low-trust and oppositional relationship to 
the state, and they do not feel things have changed 
since 1994. It is not much different for younger 
members, who do not have the same historical 
experience yet feel they have not received their 
dues either in terms of resources, opportunities or 
People do not necessarily trust that the information they 
submit to a digital platform will be handled in a way that 
is secure, transparent and free from corruption – or that it 
will actually have any visible impact.
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12 This is an ongoing movement of students and academics that began as protests against the increasing costs of university 
education for black and historically marginalised communities in South Africa. The University of the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg is a centre of coordinated activities (www.feesmustfall.joburg) as well as University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban 
University of Technology, Tshwane University of Technology and movements such as Rhodes Must Fall at the University of 
Cape Town.
13 Rhodes Must Fall is a movement that started on the University of Cape Town campus with a demand to remove the statue of 
Cecil Rhodes; this was, however, part of a larger demand (which was eventually met) to dismantle the institutionalised racism 
in higher education in South Africa (http://rhodesmustfall.co.za/).
14 Personal communication with Koketso Moeti (January 2016) and Achal Prabhala (January 2016). 
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rights as equal South African citizens. The strong 
ground-up student movement, Fees Must Fall,12 
and the success of Rhodes Must Fall13 in 2015, are 
clear examples of their unhappiness at how, 20 
years after the de jure end of apartheid, historically 
marginal communities continue to live in poverty 
and face discrimination. 
Media reports indicate that there have been violent 
clashes between students of the Fees Must Fall 
campaigns and police (Al Jazeera America 2015), 
and universities have brought in private security 
and threatened academic staff who are supporting 
student activism.14 The state’s use of violence 
to challenge the right of its citizens to protest, 
and the maintenance of secrecy and surveillance, 
indicates a mistrust of activism. This serves to 
shrink the space for activism and dissent generally, 
and this study documented this in the context of 
low-income and marginal communities around 
Johannesburg. An example is Thembelihle, a 
residential neighbourhood where citizens protesting 
lack of services have faced violence, and people’s 
protests have been actively repressed by authorities 
(Clark 2014). The attacks on and surveillance 
of protesting citizens of Thembelihle, and the 
activists of shack dwellers’ movements, point to the 
criminalisation of activists and movements.
The incidents and experiences reported by 
respondents, and the current climate of activism 
in South Africa, point to deeply fractured 
communication between the state and citizens, 
which will have to be addressed, and rid of violence, 
before it improves.
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5. Reflections and learnings
This section presents reflections and analysis 
based on the case studies to inform the strategies 
and approaches of communities engaged in 
T4T&A activities. The two case studies describe 
very different contexts. Bringing them together 
in this report does not imply similarities between 
them; rather, the intention here is to distil lessons 
from both and present them together, and to find 
points of similarity that reinforce learnings about 
applications of technology.
The two case studies began as a question about 
how and if the inability to guarantee privacy and 
anonymity online introduced risks in marginalised 
activists’ use of technology tools in their 
advocacy and activism. As Seda Guerses notes, 
anonymity is an end rather than a means, which 
enables – among other things – participation, 
a collective voice and a distributed message 
(Guerses 2012). Tactical Tech’s work has shown 
that the use of mobile phones and social media 
has put activists, and marginalised communities, 
at risk. Yet limiting the risks of using technology 
is also complex and challenging, and requires 
particular skills and training. In framing a 
question around these concerns, this study 
began with activists’ technology use and the risks 
and barriers they faced, so as to contextualise 
it within their actual practices and realities of 
work on transparency and accountability in their 
societies.
The two cases show that there is a legitimate need 
for anonymity and privacy, because technology 
platforms do create negative exposure; but that 
threats tend to be local and ‘lateral’ – that is, from 
within families, communities and movements. This 
research confirms the nature and dynamics of this 
tension for these communities and how it affects 
their use of digital technologies, and presents the 
following additional issues:
• Low levels of trust between communities of 
activists and institutional authorities affect the 
kinds of dialogue intended to be inspired by 
T4T&A.
• Marginalisation is reinforced and replicated 
within already-marginalised communities, 
perpetuating inequality and invisibility, and 
creating new centres of power.
• Violence at interpersonal, community and 
social levels is a common feature of the lives 
of marginalised people; institutionalised and 
pervasive homophobia, sexism and racism also 
serve as barriers and limitations.
• Social movements use technologies in organising 
and mobilising, and these can be a powerful 
way to motivate and reach out to marginal 
communities; movements are, however, shaped 
by their histories, and are complex, dynamic 
systems in flux. Thus, the introduction of 
technology is never straightforward, predictable 
or easy.
• A significant gap exists between T4T&A 
communities and marginalised activist 
communities, and must be bridged if T4T&A 
applications are to be successfully integrated 
into social justice work.
Customise control over 
visibility: understand user 
practices
The documentation of marginalised people’s 
inability to control negative exposure online 
suggests that the language of openness, 
transparency and visibility needs to be rephrased 
with, and for, marginalised communities that may 
be facing a range of threats from being online. 
Something that is ‘open’ may on occasion need to 
be closed, and visibility may need to be restricted 
for those who are perceived to be threatening, or 
merely outsiders. The extent of the homophobia 
faced by LGBTQ Kenyans implies the need for 
security and privacy, yet there is also an equally 
strong need to connect with others in their 
community, to have a sense of community, a social, 
emotional and sexual life, and to be visible as 
activists who are engaged in political work around 
human rights. None of this is any different from 
what other activists do elsewhere in the world.
Reviewing the tactics and approaches taken by 
LGBTQ Kenyans who are online, it can be said that 
anonymity and visibility are negotiated positions, 
constantly shifting in response to threats. 
Anonymity is intentional and purposeful in hiding 
to evade exposure, a tactic that is familiar to this 
community and continues offline and online. It is 
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15 The work of the Women’s Rights Program of the Association for Progressive Communications since 2009 (http://erotics.apc.
org/) and recent research from Women, Action and Media about harassment on Twitter (Matias et al. 2015); (http://
womenactionmedia.org/cms/assets/uploads/2015/05/wam-twitter-abuse-report.pdf) are significant in this regard.
16 Tactical Tech’s Security in a Box has custom ‘community guides’ available: https://securityinabox.org/en/lgbti-mena and 
https://securityinabox.org/en/lgbti-africa and https://securityinabox.org/en/women-hrdshope
17 For example: www.defendingwomen-defendingrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/WHRD-IC-Gendering-
Documentation-Manual-1.pdf and https://tech.safehubcollective.org/cybersecurity/ https://gendersec.tacticaltech.org/wiki/
index.php/Main_Page
18 There is recent work by Women, Action and Media, the Association for Progressive Communications and NGOs to directly lobby 
social media corporations to take a more active role in addressing online harassment and the restrictions on freedom of speech 
and expression online. Sustained advocacy against Facebook’s real name policy, and its questionable content-moderation 
practices, are already well documented and have been undertaken by various Internet governance and policy organisations.
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also a tactic to foster a sense of community. Those 
who work on direct support to LGBTQ people facing 
homophobic violence, and MSM or gay men who 
are closeted are more likely to face direct threats, 
violence or surveillance. 
For South African activists, the tension between 
visibility and anonymity has to be managed in the 
context of offline surveillance, primarily through the 
use of informants who report on fellow activists’ 
plans to the police. Protestors and the right to 
protest and dissent is particularly under attack in 
South Africa, notably in response to student-led 
movements. There is also a history of surveillance 
of activists that persists from the apartheid era 
and affects those who are especially vocal on 
state secrecy, housing issues, land redistribution 
and human rights (R2K 2015). Results show that 
communities appropriate and reshape technology 
to suit their own ends, such as the two-account 
tactic employed by LGBTQ Kenyans, or the use of 
WhatsApp to record meeting notes and mobilise by 
South African housing activists.
Some technology skills development organisations 
and networks, of which Tactical Tech is one, support 
activists in learning about how to be secure and 
private in online communications. This can be 
invaluable for individuals or organisations facing 
surveillance and monitoring by governments or 
corporate actors. Particular tactics and digital skills 
may be required by women activists, journalists and 
advocates who face harassment and harm online; 
the harassment they face is explicitly gendered 
and sexualised.15 Tactical Tech’s work has also 
documented the need for particular tactics online 
and offline by marginalised communities, such 
as LGBTQ people in the Middle East, North Africa 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, and women human rights 
defenders and activists online.16 There has also been 
a mushrooming of similar projects and resources to 
mitigate the online harassment of women activists 
and journalists.17
These resources and projects attempt to support 
marginalised groups online to be skilled in the 
control of their visibility and anonymity in their use 
of social media as a response to negative exposure: 
outing, harassment, revenge porn, threats and 
so on. Control and responsibility are both placed 
on the individual, a theme that privacy scholars 
may say is unfair at best and untenable at worst 
(Kazansky 2015). NGOs and policy advocacy 
groups are also working on influencing technology 
platforms to improve their functionalities to support 
freedom of speech and expression online.18 
User research and use-experience design are 
important fields that recognise both the need 
for customisation of technology platforms and 
interfaces based on users’ particular contexts, as 
well as the ways in which users reshape technology 
platforms. Designer Caroline Sinders (2015), for 
example, is attempting to resist online harassment 
and violence through redesigning platforms.
The redesign of entire platforms is not something 
that T4T&A advocates and technologists need 
to do. However, the development of technology 
applications does need to recognise user contexts, 
and users’ own productive reshaping of technology 
to meet their needs. T4T&A applications could 
also adopt user-experience research approaches 
and practices to understand individual community 
practices associated with technology use. The 
case of the crowdmap, Utunzi, underscores the 
Marginalised and activist communities appropriate 
and reshape technology to suit their own ends
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value of user research and understanding what 
kind of visibility a community needs and wants. 
Community participation in the technology 
development process is an obvious solution, but 
more valuable perhaps is a deeper appreciation of 
difference and diverse actors within a community, 
and their roles.
As the South African case indicates, women are in 
greater need of controlling their visibility, and in 
some cases feel secure in speaking out under the 
cover of anonymity; it is very different for a white, 
male Right to Know activist to demand complete 
transparency than it is for a black, female, 
community-based housing activist. How can 
technology applications respond to the contextual 
differences between different groups of users, or 
within a group of users?
It is also important for technologists to understand 
what is not working. Why did people start and 
then abandon a platform or tool? How can 
their patterns of use inform the development 
of future applications? Innovations to address 
infrastructural limitations associated with 
technology use and applications in resource-poor 
settings are now common; the two case studies 
indicate that personal, community and socio-
technical contexts limit the use of technology 
– particularly social media – and this needs to be 
acknowledged and addressed as well.
Address difference across 
movements and communities 
of practice
There are limited connections between the 
different communities that work on T4T&A and 
the marginalised groups that participated in the 
two country case studies. Different approaches 
to change and rights evolve against varying 
historical contexts of discrimination / privilege, 
marginalisation / inclusion, and activism.
An instance where the outcome of different 
communities working together was not positive 
– but was eventually turned around – was that 
of Utunzi. In parallel, there is the social media 
feed, Speak Out, that is for and about the LGBTQ 
community’s own needs for transparency and 
collective security. There is a note of pride in 
people’s voices, and a sense of community 
ownership, when they talk about it. It is an obvious 
statement that people from outside a community, 
who see a problem and create a solution for it 
without the engagement of that community, will 
often find that they solved the wrong problem.
In the South Africa case study, the sampling 
determination exercise revealed the challenge in 
identifying a robust sample that was representative 
of the different communities working on housing 
and urban development rights. The list of actors 
in this space included policy researchers and 
academics to shack-dwelling activists. While this 
was a valuable input to the sampling process, it 
was also an important finding. Although there 
were exceptions, there was some segregation 
by race, class and city of different actors who 
might ostensibly be considered part of the same 
movement. Formative interviews from South Africa 
also strongly highlighted the role of intermediaries, 
often with reference to T4T&A actors who are 
involved in promoting civic technology applications 
for communities to engage with the state.
Movements can offer a dynamic arena within 
which to engage with communities, but they also 
come with their particularities which must be 
factored in before engaging in T4T&A activities. 
Brendan Halloran and Walter Flores, writing for 
the Transparency and Accountability Initiative, 
introduce a series on movements and their role in 
accountability practices and activities (Halloran 
and Flores 2015), which suggests a ‘movements 
approach’ to transparency and accountability 
actions. Our research seems to support that, 
but with a careful consideration of the nature of 
The social media feed, Speak Out, is for and about the LGBTQ 
community’s own needs for transparency and collective 
security. There is a note of pride in people’s voices, and a sense 
of community ownership, when they talk about it.
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19 Tactical Tech offered some reflections and lessons based on a two-year project with sex-worker communities in India and 
Cambodia that had to negotiate some of these issues (Slater et al. 2015) 
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movements and to integrate with them sensitively 
given the many differences that exist within them.
Movements are not monolithic and carry diverse 
histories, politics and communities within them. 
They also have their own power dynamics and 
create their own centres of power and margins, 
creating new contours of marginalisation. Both case 
studies show evidence of this, and of the particular 
marginalisation of women. Women and people 
identifying as women could be encouraged and 
supported to take on more leadership roles within 
movements as key actors in T4T&A activities, and 
with the recognition that this would be the first time 
for many of these individuals and groups to have 
this sort of agency.
Fostering spaces for technologists and community-
based advocates to work together and learn 
about each other could result in technical people 
learning more about the needs of communities for 
whom T4T&A applications are built, and for the 
development of custom solutions and community 
ownership on T4T&A projects. Technologists need 
to work in partnership with activist communities 
and movements in developing T4T&A tools that 
reflect the needs and experiences of proposed 
end-users. This could, in theory, increase the trust 
among potential end-users, and have a positive 
knock-on effect on the adoption and diffusion of 
T4T&A projects.
This may, however, require the assimilation 
of very different approaches to technology, 
development, human rights, and transparency 
and accountability. How different communities 
come together and collaborate, despite the vast 
differences between them, is not an issue easily 
addressed in this discussion; however some 
connections are offered here.19 
Andrew Schrock (2016) traces a history of ‘civic 
hacking’ in the USA, making connections between 
technology movements – such as ‘hacktivism’ – and 
transparency movements such as open data and 
freedom of access to information. He discusses 
the particular origins of ‘civic hacking’ and 
applications of technology to address the opacity 
of public institutions, and says that civic hackers 
are ‘Utopian realists’. How ‘Utopian realism’ 
merges with the human rights focus and local 
activisms of the marginalised actors interviewed 
here is beyond the scope of this discussion, but is 
a question that surfaces through the results. The 
distance between communities ‘on the ground’ and 
external ‘experts’ has an uncomfortable legacy, 
from colonial dominance and missionary work, 
to more recent development projects. Efforts to 
bridge communities must recognise these different 
histories, and the history of engagement with 
technologies in colonial times, and in post-colonial 
nation-building, and in moments of crisis, conflict 
and revolution. 
Miriyam Aouragh and her colleagues (2015) write 
about some of these entanglements between 
‘activist’ and ‘techie’ movements by investigating 
web-based campaign sites that claim to bridge 
the existing gap between social justice activists 
and progressive techies. The authors “share[d] 
a curiosity about the pursuit of fundamental 
change that takes place at different political 
temporalities alongside techno-inventions” (2015: 
209) and “attempted to develop a vocabulary 
and offer a snapshot that could help us attend 
to the naturalised divisions of labour and the 
delegation practices of technology that manifest 
themselves between activists for social justice and 
activists for just technologies” (2015: 229). They 
found troubling replications of universalist ideas 
about technology that concealed the politics and 
locations of different actors. They recommend 
vigilant critiques of these associations and of 
the languages, mechanisms and assumptions of 
change folded into them.
The work of Kavita Philip, Lily Irani and their 
collaborators to develop “post-colonial computing” 
as a newer approach to digital divides, economic 
disparities and varying cultural epistemologies is 
another fruitful resource for T4T&A design and 
development projects (Irani et al. 2010; Philip et al. 
2012).
Philip, Irani and Dourish say that post-colonial 
computing is “a way of asking questions, a mode 
of investigating and a form of conversation ... an 
approach to familiar areas of research that could 
too easily slip into simple, rigid patterns, achieving 
closure and canonicity at the expense of discovery 
and experimentation ”(2012: 21).
The post-colonial computing discourse does not 
start with ‘development’, but is “centered on the 
questions of power, authority, legitimacy, 
participation, and intelligibility in the contexts of 
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cultural encounter, particularly in the context of 
contemporary globalisation” (Irani et al. 2010: 1). 
By re-reading the scripts of techno-scientific 
development projects, such as One Laptop Per 
Child, post-colonial computing approaches 
reformulate cultural difference positively as new, 
creative possibilities. This approach challenges 
dualisms of developed / underdeveloped, or 
traditional / scientific, and decolonises the 
production of knowledge about post-colonial 
locations. It suggests that computational design 
practices and approaches are created transnationally, 
in situ, rather than from predetermined, fixed 
locations of users and agentic designers; and 
evolve as a function of relationships between 
designers, developers and users, local contextual 
forces (Philip et al. 2012: 5–7). Philip et al. 
say that: 
“This assemblage includes not only the dreams 
of design but the messiness of manufacture as 
well. It links materials sourcing, the context of 
making, and legal regimes, with the historical 
fields of discourse that make computational 
design possible today. Just as STS [science 
and technology studies] has highlighted the 
need to examine the socially situated and 
contingent nature of scientific practice, so we 
want to draw attention to the dynamics and 
contingencies of design methods, in order 
better to understand how they might be subject 
to new forms of translation, transformation, and 
reconfiguration“ (2012: 6).
The results of the Utunzi case and the use of 
PAIAs to get access to the housing list in South 
Africa, offer additional insights and reflections 
about how race, class and gender differences 
matter in applying T4T&A. The awareness of 
varying histories and ambitions should not be 
a gratuitous indulgence of difference per se; 
it should be used to productively shape and 
inform mechanisms for articulating shared, 
and divergent, theories of change through 
the application of T4T&A. Different ideas of 
change through technology and data originate 
in particular histories of engagement with the 
state; so, those who believe in ‘connecting 
citizens to states through wires and expecting 
them to talk to each other’ may need to verify 
these assumptions with target communities. 
Or, if certain users and practitioners within a 
movement require greater privacy than others, 
how can that be factored in?
Schrock (2016) points out that within the 
historical evolution of civic hacking and the move 
from information to data in the transparency 
movement, the objective may well be the receipt 
of information from the state, but not a plan for 
what is done with that information, as respondents 
in this study have noted. He ends by saying that 
new mechanisms and approaches may be needed 
beyond just applications of technology, as has 
been discussed here:
“Systemic social disparities are often intractable. 
The route to alleviate them has never been 
detachment or abandonment. Looking forward, 
we should pay attention to how data activism 
and advocacy might result in meaningful 
systematic change beyond the usual claims 
of ‘transparency.’ To fulfil the possibilities for 
meaningful social change hinted at in their 
history, civic hackers might have to coordinate 
around specific mechanisms for change and 
articulate a deeper sense of democracy than 
the language of technology provides” (Schrock 
2016: 15).
Put human rights first
Results from this paper are filtered into reflections 
on the need to engage users and user practices 
in the development of T4T&A applications; and to 
productively address the differences within and 
across movements in these engaged collaborations. 
However, this study concludes with the obvious 
statement that for such communities to be involved 
in T4T&A activities beyond organising, mobilising 
and developing a community identity, they need 
to feel more confident and assured that their 
engagement will result in positive change and not 
be penalised.
The LGBTQ activists from Kenya, and the low-
income black and mixed-race activists in South 
Africa, are in states of significant marginalisation, 
and criminalisation by the state. The facts of 
marginalisation and lack of rights cannot be 
ignored, and perhaps have to be the primary 
subject of T4T&A activities and engagement. 
This is not to suggest that T4T&A activities 
cannot happen until poverty or marginalisation 
are eradicated. Rather, it is to suggest that a 
government that may be transparent about aid 
flows or the repair of public toilets, yet does not 
address the violence against its queer citizens, 
or continues to use violence and surveillance 
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to squash dissent by marginalised citizens who 
simply need basic services, is an example of the 
selective transparency that Dieter Zinnbauer has 
spoken of. It is this institutionalised selective 
transparency that allows for the perpetuation 
of marginalisation in society; it is perhaps this 
selective transparency that should be the focus of 
T4T&A activities.
There is a pervasive misconception about the 
benefits of technology in bringing about social 
change. Technology platforms do not bring about 
change themselves and quite often just replicate 
the inequalities and divisions which exist in the 
offline world. Nevertheless, many online tools are 
used within the community, and to great effect. 
While digital and Web 2.0 technologies have the 
ability to access or generate data that could hold 
governments to account, what is perhaps required 
is the ability to know how to use that data in 
advocacy and campaigning; it is not an end-point in 
itself. Marginal groups perhaps need to learn how 
to engage with information as strategic leverage in 
advocacy for their rights. Of course, for this to be 
successful, members of marginalised groups need 
to feel that their rights are respected and they will 
not be punished for demanding them.
In a 2007 paper that reported on interaction 
with low-income, marginalised women living in a 
transitional home facility, Virginia Eubanks offered 
compelling insights to what it could mean for such 
people to use technology and become part of the 
“high tech equity agenda” (Eubanks 2007: no 
page). She used the concept of the digital divide 
and asked women in the facility what it would take 
for people like them, the ‘have-nots’, to become 
‘haves’. Through a drawing exercise, the women 
created a vision of what it would take for them to 
become more active users of technology to address 
their marginalisation. None of these drawings were 
about building new skills or resources. The barriers 
they identified were structural inequality, systemic 
inequality, racial prejudice, greed, classism, 
economic exploitation, basic needs, education, 
and other social supports. The way to bridge the 
divide, Eubanks concluded, was not to focus on the 
users themselves, but on the structural inequalities 
they face. The women in the study recommended 
stronger networks that connected people to each 
other as a way of bridging a range of divides: 
social, economic and infrastructural. It was only 
through people’s connections to, and empathy for, 
each other that these women believed technology 
would have any valuable role. 
There is a pervasive misconception about the benefits of 
technology in bringing about social change. Technology 
platforms do not bring about change themselves. Quite 
often, they just replicate the inequalities and divisions 
which exist in the offline world.
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